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OHN MARTIN FISCHER AND MARK RAVIZZA offer a theory of 
moral responsibility in their seminal (1998) work that continues to be a 
promising route to the compatibility of determinism and responsibility. 
Fischer and Ravizza (henceforth F&R) motivate their theory partly on the 
basis of Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs), which are putative counterexamples to 
the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP).1 More specifically, they take 
FSCs to show that regulative control – a dual power to either do something 
or refrain from doing it – is not necessary for responsibility. So PAP is false. 
Instead, only guidance control – a “one-way” power – is necessary for re-
sponsibility. However, alternative possibilities are relevant to assessing 
whether one possesses guidance control. I argue that F&R’s theory (hence-
forth Reasons-Responsiveness) is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility 
of time travel. Before turning to my argument, I will first lay out the basics 
behind Reasons-Responsiveness. 
 
1. Reasons-Responsiveness 
 
F&R understand guidance control to involve two components: the mecha-
nism M that issues in an agent S’s φ-ing must be S’s own, and M must be (at 
least) moderately reasons-responsive. A mechanism M is moderately reasons-
responsive iff M is regularly reasons-receptive and weakly reasons-reactive. A 
mechanism M that issues in S’s φ-ing is (at least) regularly reasons-receptive 
iff there is some set x of nomologically identical worlds2 (i.e., worlds with the 
same laws of nature as the world in which M issues in S’s φ-ing) in which 
there is sufficient reason3 for S to refrain from φ-ing, and S recognizes 
(through M) that there is sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing.4 Lastly, a 
mechanism M that issues in S’s φ-ing is (at least) weakly reasons-reactive iff 
there are some worlds that are members of x in which S refrains from φ-ing 
(through M).5 
So, although an agent S who φs in an FSC cannot refrain from φ-ing, so 
long as the mechanism M that issues in S’s φ-ing is S’s own and M is moder-
ately reasons-responsive, then S is morally responsible for φ-ing.6 With this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Frankfurt (1969). 
2 Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 44). 
3 At least some of the reasons must be moral reasons (ibid.: 76-81). 
4 A further feature of regular reasons-receptivity is that it involves an understandable pattern of 
receptivity to actual and hypothetical reasons (ibid.: 69-73). For brevity’s sake I will not men-
tion this feature of regular reasons-receptivity until section 4. 
5 For a complete overview of moderate reasons-responsiveness, see ibid., ch. 3. 
6 I ignore the epistemic condition on responsibility given its irrelevance to the discussion at 
hand. 
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basic understanding of Reasons-Responsiveness in place, I now turn to an issue 
that bears directly upon my argument, viz., the issue of mechanism individua-
tion. 
 
2. Mechanism Individuation and Intrinsicness 
 
In order to determine whether a mechanism that issues in an agent’s action is 
moderately reasons-responsive, we need to hold fixed this mechanism when 
evaluating what occurs in nomologically identical worlds. But how are mech-
anisms to be individuated? What exactly do we hold fixed? F&R explicitly say 
that the mechanism relevant to assessing an agent’s responsibility must be 
temporally intrinsic or nonrelational, which is to be understood as follows: 
“if a mechanism M issues in act A, then M is relevant to the agent’s guidance 
control of A only if M’s operating does not entail that A occurs.”7 F&R take 
this necessary condition for a mechanism being relevant to the agent’s guid-
ance control to rule out the possibility of the preemptive intervener of an 
FSC even partly constituting S’s moderately reasons-responsive mechanism. 
For the presence of the preemptive intervener is supposed to entail that S φs. 
So what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining whether 
a mechanism is relevant to the agent’s guidance control? F&R do not say, 
though they presuppose that there is some natural way to individuate be-
tween mechanisms that are and are not relevant to an agent’s guidance con-
trol. Might the above necessary condition for a mechanism being relevant to 
an agent’s guidance control be sufficient? No. The fact that S is one mile 
away from, say, the post office, is surely irrelevant to whether a moderately 
reasons-responsive mechanism issues in S’s φ-ing. In other words, S’s extrin-
sic property of being one mile away from the post office does not even partly 
constitute a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism M that issues in S’s φ-
ing. This suggests that, according to Reasons-Responsiveness, a moderately rea-
sons-responsive mechanism M that issues in S’s φ-ing is wholly constituted by 
S’s intrinsic properties (either all of S’s intrinsic properties or, more likely, 
some subset thereof).8 I will henceforth refer to this position as Intrinsic-
Mechanism. Note that Intrinsic-Mechanism has the following implication: If two 
agents, S and S*, are intrinsic duplicates of one another, and S has a moder-
ately reasons-responsive mechanism, then S* likewise has a moderately rea-
sons-responsive mechanism.9 
F&R do not explicitly endorse or reject Intrinsic-Mechanism. However, if 
they were to reject Intrinsic-Mechanism, the burden would be on them to speci-
fy some non-ad hoc criterion for distinguishing between mechanisms that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid.: 47. 
8 Note that nothing I say here hinges upon whether we reify mechanisms. 
9 This implication of Intrinsic-Mechanism is consistent with the claim that S and S* may have 
different histories, such that S’s moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is S’s own, but 
S*’s moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is not S*’s own. 
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and are not moderately reasons-responsive, whereby a moderately reasons-
responsive mechanism can be partly constituted by some of S’s extrinsic 
properties. Attempting to offer such a criterion would arguably be quite chal-
lenging. So, it would be better ceteris paribus for F&R if they endorsed Intrinsic-
Mechanism. However, as I will argue below, if F&R accept Intrinsic-Mechanism, 
they must reject the metaphysical possibility of time travel.  
 
3. A Time Travel Case 
 
Consider the following Case 1:10 
 
Amy lives in a peculiar world for two reasons. First, time travel is nomo-
logically possible (and thus metaphysically possible). Second, individuals 
in this world have terrifying powers. More specifically, the laws of nature 
entail that an individual x can kill another individual y through a basic 
mental action, viz., by willing that y dies. However, y can continue to live 
by performing the basic mental act of willing to nullify x’s act. Now, 
through the use of a time machine, Amy travels 20 years back in time. 
Amy exits the time machine, and confronts Young Zoe. Amy wills that 
Young Zoe die. However, Young Zoe wills to nullify Amy’s act. So Amy 
does not succeed in killing Young Zoe. Young Zoe’s mental act of willing 
to nullify Amy’s act issues from mechanism M, which is moderately rea-
sons-responsive. 
 
If M is moderately reasons-responsive, then there is some set of nomologi-
cally identical worlds in which Young Zoe recognizes (through M) that there 
is sufficient reason to refrain from nullifying Amy’s act. And in some of 
those worlds, Young Zoe refrains (through M) from nullifying Amy’s act, 
and thus dies. Now, consider a case like Case 1, except that Amy is replaced 
with Young Zoe’s older self, Old Zoe. Call this Case 2: 
 
Old Zoe lives in a world that is nomologically identical to the world men-
tioned in Case 1. Now, through the use of a time machine, Old Zoe travels 
20 years back in time. Old Zoe exits the time machine and confronts 
Young Zoe. Old Zoe wills that Young Zoe die. However, Young Zoe 
wills to nullify Old Zoe’s act. So Old Zoe does not succeed in killing 
Young Zoe. Young Zoe’s mental act of nullifying Old Zoe’s act issues 
from mechanism M*. 
 
Let us consider the implications of Cases 1 and 2. As a matter of stipulation, 
Young Zoe has the exact same set of intrinsic properties in Cases 1 and 2.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I owe the inspiration for this case to Joshua Spencer’s (2013) ingenious time travel FSC 
against PAP. While F&R reject PAP, they nevertheless maintain that alternative possibilities 
are relevant to assessing an agent’s responsibility. For this reason, my argument rests on a 
case that shares certain structural similarities to Spencer’s putative counterexample to PAP. 
However, despite the fact that Spencer and I employ similar cases against different positions, 
there is no good reason to think that my argument and Spencer’s argument stand or fall to-
gether. 
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So, given that M is moderately reasons-responsive, it follows from Intrinsic-
Mechanism that M* is likewise moderately reasons-responsive. However, as I 
will now explain, it cannot be the case that M* is moderately reasons-
responsive. 
If M* is moderately reasons-responsive, then there is some set of nomo-
logically identical worlds in which Young Zoe recognizes (through M*) that 
there is sufficient reason to refrain from nullifying Old Zoe’s act, and in at 
least some of those worlds Young Zoe refrains from nullifying Old Zoe’s act 
(through M*). In that case, for any such world w in which Young Zoe re-
frains from nullifying Old Zoe’s act (through M*), Young Zoe dies in w. 
However, Young Zoe’s dying is incompatible with Old Zoe’s existing. More 
generally, Zoe’s existing later than Zoe’s death relative to Zoe’s personal time 
is metaphysically impossible.12 So there is no nomologically identical world in 
which Young Zoe refrains from nullifying Old Zoe’s act (through M*). For 
this reason, it cannot be the case that M* is moderately reasons-responsive. 
So, if Intrinsic-Mechanism is true, F&R must reject the metaphysical possibility 
of time travel. 
 
4. An Objection 
 
Consider the following objection: In regard to assessing whether M* is mod-
erately reasons-responsive, we just need to hold fixed the fact that it is some-
one qualitatively similar to Old Zoe (rather than Old Zoe herself) who wills 
that Young Zoe die. Consequently, we can maintain that there is a nomologi-
cally identical world in which the following is true: (a) someone qualitatively 
similar to Old Zoe wills that Young Zoe die, (b) Young Zoe refrains 
(through M*) from nullifying this person’s act, and (c) Young Zoe dies. So 
we can maintain that M* is moderately reasons-responsive. Thus, F&R can 
accept both Intrinsic-Mechanism and the metaphysical possibility of time trav-
el.13 
My reply is as follows: While we must hold fixed the mechanism that is-
sues in an agent’s action when evaluating nomologically identical worlds, this 
cannot be all that is held fixed. To illustrate, consider what F&R say about 
the saber killer case, a case in which a person boarded a ferry and proceeded 
to kill fellow passengers with a saber. Suppose that the mechanism X that 
issued in the saber killer’s decision to kill the fellow passengers is such that 
there is only one possible scenario in which the saber killer recognizes 
(through X) that he thereby has more reason not to kill the fellow passen-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 If for some reason this stipulation turns out to be problematic, it is surely unproblematic 
to stipulate that in Cases 1 and 2 Young Zoe has the exact same set of intrinsic properties 
that are even remotely viable candidates for constituting a moderately reasons-responsive 
mechanism. Moreover, this latter stipulation suffices for my argument to go through. 
12 See Lewis (1976: 145-46) on the distinction between external time and personal time. 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this consideration to my attention. 
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gers, and refrains (through X) from killing the fellow passengers.14 Suppose, 
moreover, that the reason in question is that some passenger is smoking a 
Gambier pipe in the lower cabin, and that this reason is not understandable 
from a third party’s perspective.15 In other words, suppose this pattern of 
reasons-recognition is not even minimally grounded in reality.16 In that case, 
F&R would say that X – which issued in a decision to kill the fellow passen-
gers – is not moderately reasons-responsive.  
The above summary of F&R’s position is consistent with the claim that 
there is a nomologically identical world in which the saber killer recognizes 
(through X) that he has more reason not to kill different but qualitatively similar 
passengers (whereby this reason is minimally grounded in reality), and re-
frains (through X) from killing different but qualitatively similar passengers.17 So, 
at least sometimes, the question of how a mechanism might issue in an inten-
tional action that concerns in some manner qualitatively similar yet numeri-
cally distinct individuals is irrelevant. Similarly, in regard to Case 2, even if 
there is a nomologically identical world in which Young Zoe refrains 
(through M*) from nullifying the act of someone who is qualitatively similar 
to Old Zoe, this has no bearing upon whether M* is moderately reasons-
responsive. The more general point is that some things other than the agent’s 
mechanism must be held fixed in order to determine whether in nomologi-
cally identical worlds the agent performs or refrains from performing the same 
intentional action. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the following is an inconsistent triad: 
 
i. A mechanism M is moderately reasons-responsive iff M is regularly reasons-
receptive and weakly reasons-reactive. 
ii. Intrinsic-Mechanism: a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism M that issues in 
S’s φ-ing is wholly constituted by S’s intrinsic properties. 
iii. Time travel is metaphysically possible. 
 
F&R are explicitly committed to (i). Moreover, a natural interpretation of 
Reasons-Responsiveness suggests that Intrinsic-Mechanism is true. At any rate, I 
have suggested that if F&R were to reject Intrinsic-Mechanism, the burden 
would be on them to specify some non-ad hoc criterion for distinguishing be-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 65). 
15 Ibid.: 72. 
16 Ibid.: 73. 
17 I am presupposing that a de re reading of “the fellow passengers” determines the individu-
als being referred to in the saber killer case. If, however, F&R have a principled reason to 
adopt a de dicto reading of “the fellow passengers,” this is not detrimental for what I wish to 
argue for here. For even if we adopt a de dicto reading of such phrases, my point still holds 
for a saber-killer case in which the phrase “the fellow passengers” is replaced with, e.g., “the 
saber killer’s family.” 
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tween mechanisms that are and are not moderately reasons-responsive, 
whereby a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism can be partly constitut-
ed by some of S’s extrinsic properties. Such a criterion, I think, will not come 
easy. So it appears that Reasons-Responsiveness is in fact incompatible with the 
metaphysical possibility of time travel. This comes at a cost to the theory. 
For one of the motivations for Reasons-Responsiveness is that, unlike libertarian-
ism, Reasons-Responsiveness is not threatened by certain propositions that for all 
we know are true, such as that our world is deterministic.18 This motivation 
becomes somewhat deflated given that Reasons-Responsiveness is likewise 
threatened by a proposition that for all we know is true, viz., that time travel 
is metaphysically possible. Moreover, those who are attracted to the meta-
physical possibility of time travel thereby have good reason to reject Reasons-
Responsiveness in its current form.19,20 
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18 Ibid.: 14-16. 
19 For a defense of the metaphysical possibility of time travel, see, e.g., Dowe (2000). See 
Artzenius and Maudlin (2002) on the nomological possibility of time travel. Note that if 
F&R were to reject the metaphysical possibility of time travel, they also cannot employ 
Spencer’s (2013) time travel FSC against PAP. 
20 For helpful discussion and comments on a previous draft of this paper, I am grateful to 
John Fischer, Mark Heller and an anonymous referee. 
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